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The Guatemalan raspberry industry began exporting to theUnited States in the late 1980s, filling a market niche in
the spring and fall when supplies were low. By 1996,
Guatemalan raspberry exports were increasing rapidly, up 113
percent from the previous season. That spring and early sum-
mer, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) and Health Canada received reports of more than
1,465 cases of food-borne illness from Cyclospora, a proto-
zoan parasite. Although no one died, the large number of
cases generated substantial adverse publicity. Initially, investiga-
tors linked the outbreak to California strawberries, but they
finally decided that it was associated with Guatemalan raspber-
ries. This case study reviews the efforts to resolve this food
safety problem. It is a cautionary tale about the serious impact
a food safety outbreak can have on a promising industry.
By the time raspberries were identified as the most likely
source of contamination, the Guatemalan spring season was
over, so the United States took no immediate regulatory
action. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the
CDC sent a team of investigators to Guatemala to observe
growing conditions. Because Cyclospora was relatively
unknown and had never before been associated with raspber-
ries, no one knew which farms or berries were contaminated,
how they became contaminated, or how to solve the prob-
lem.The Guatemalan Berry Commission (GBC), a growers’
organization, responded slowly to the outbreak. Growers
came to no consensus on whether there was a problem and
were reluctant to accept the FDA's assertion that the contami-
nated product came from Guatemala, since the claim was
based on epidemiology alone with no physical proof. (In fact,
the FDA did not find physical evidence of Cyclospora contami-
nation on Guatemalan raspberries until 2000.)  Microbial con-
tamination is often low level and sporadic, which makes it diffi-
cult to detect. And with perishable produce there is rarely
anything left to test by the time an investigation begins. Some
growers suspected that the problem was really a trade barrier
to protect the U.S. industry from Guatemalan competition.
Lack of scientific information compounded the industry’s prob-
lems in formulating a response.
By 1997, the GBC had developed a system to characterize
a farm’s risk potential: only low-risk farms could export in the
spring season. However, the plan had no enforcement mecha-
nism and no traceback system. That spring another large out-
break of food-borne illness in the United States and Canada
implicated Guatemalan raspberries. After consulting with the
FDA, the GBC voluntarily stopped exporting raspberries to
the United States in May 1997.
After a second season of contamination problems, both
the GBC and the government of Guatemala realized that more
stringent controls and enforcement were required. In
November 1997, the Guatemalan government created a com-
mission with enforcement power to lead the effort to improve
food safety. But in December, the FDA, not yet convinced the
problem was resolved, issued an import alert, denying all
Guatemalan raspberries entry into the United States. An
import alert for a specific product from an entire country,
rather than from specific firms, was an unusual response, and
one used only after all other means of resolving the problem
were exhausted. With good traceback, the FDA might have
been able to target just those growers with a problem, but in
this case the FDA could not identify the problem farms. An
import alert without physical evidence was also highly unusual
at that time. Since 1997, however, the FDA has become less
reluctant to deny imports on epidemiological evidence alone.
Many organizations helped the Guatemalans solve the
Cyclospora problem. The FDA, CDC, Health Canada, and the
Canadian Food Inspection Agency all provided advice and tech-
nical assistance.The GBC also sought help from the Food
Marketing Institute in Washington, D.C., which represents U.S.
retail buyers.
In 1999, three years after the first outbreak, the United
States allowed entry of raspberries produced under the Model
Plan of Excellence (MPE), a mandatory joint program of the
GBC and the government of Guatemala. The MPE requires
export growers to comply with a detailed program of food
safety practices and to pass frequent inspections by the
Integral Program for Agricultural and Environmental
Protection, a Guatemalan public-private organization, as well as
undergo FDA audits. A code is applied to each container of
raspberries, which allows it to be traced back to an individual
grower. With traceback, the export authority of any firm asso-
ciated with a food safety problem can be revoked. Based on
traceback, the FDA concluded that several outbreaks due to
Cyclospora contamination in the United States in 1999 were
not associated with Guatemalan berries. In 2000 there were
two outbreaks traced back to one Guatemalan farm, which
was removed from the MPE program. No outbreaks have
been associated with Guatemalan raspberries since 2000. To
help meet the cost of the MPE program and public relations
work, the GBC charges producers a fee per box of exported
berries.
The MPE has been a technical but not an economic suc-
cess for the raspberry industry. Although the MPE is arguably
the strictest industry-wide program for raspberry production
in the hemisphere, the Guatemalan industry has shrunk dra-
matically. In 1996, before the contamination problem began,
the number of raspberry growers was estimated to be 85; by
2002, only 3 remained. In 2001, Guatemalan raspberry exports
to the United States were only 16 percent of the 1996 level
(see figure). For many growers, the decision to leave the
industry was based on losses incurred as foreign demand col-
lapsed and export markets closed, rather than on the costs of
implementing the MPE.
While Guatemala worked to increase food safety, other
competitors, such as Mexico, made inroads into its U.S. market.
Prior to the 1996 outbreaks, the size and growth of
Guatemalan and Mexican exports to the United States were
similar. Today Mexico supplies about half of U.S. raspberry
imports. It has been difficult for the Guatemalan industry to
recover from the negative publicity. With back-to-back out-
breaks in 1996 and 1997, many buyers decided to purchase
raspberries elsewhere.
The problem with raspberries also adversely affected
other products such as blackberries, with 2001 exports only
52 percent of their 1996 level. In addition to food safety as a
possible reason for shrinking exports, blackberry growers
faced decreased demand because retailers prefer to buy a mix
of berry products. When Guatemala could only provide black-
berries, many buyers purchased from other regions. Nonberry
products suffered only temporary decreases in demand.
Looking at the raspberry industry alone, the costs of
developing and running the MPE program seem to exceed the
benefits. At first no one had any idea of how costly it would
be to resolve the contamination and reputation problems. But
some believe that Guatemala really had no choice: it had to
deal with Cyclospora. For example, if Guatemalan officials had
determined that raspberries posed a great risk and banned
exports, doubt about the extent of the problem might have
affected demand for the rest of Guatemala’s agricultural export
industry. But the scientific knowledge and insti-
tutional framework developed through the MPE
program is a public good that also benefits other
producer groups. Some growers use the MPE
food safety recommendations voluntarily but
with only monthly inspections. For raspberries,
the almost-daily field and warehouse inspections
during the export season are the most expen-
sive part of the program and are thought to be
too costly to replicate for industries with no 
history of contamination. Grower organizations
for mangoes and several types of vegetables
encourage their members to comply voluntarily.
Thus when looking at the entire Guatemalan
agricultural export industry, the benefits of MPE
appear much larger and may perhaps exceed 
the costs.
The Guatemalan problem with Cyclospora
was a critical event in the  produce industry.
Producers everywhere noted the devastating
impact a food safety problem could have on an
entire industry and learned important lessons:
(1) delay in addressing such a problem may adversely affect an
industry's exports and reputation; (2) the FDA may make deci-
sions on trade restrictions based on epidemiological evidence
alone without physical evidence; (3) improved traceback allows
trade restrictions to be targeted at individuals with contamina-
tion problems and not at the entire industry; and (4) strong
grower organizations can improve an industry's ability to deal
with food safety outbreaks. When the California strawberry
industry was initially and incorrectly implicated in the 1996
outbreak, Guatemalan growers saw the California Strawberry
Commission respond quickly and strongly to the negative pub-
licity. The GBC learned from that experience and has signifi-
cantly improved its ability to deal with such a situation, should
one occur in the future.■
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